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Lamas, Oracles, Channels, and the Law:
Reconsidering Religion and
Social Theory
Rebecca R. French*
A summer ago I returned to India for two months to look for new
fieldsites and also to attend a series of ceremonies being conducted by
the Dalai Lama in a previously closed section of the Greater
Himalayas, the tiny Tibetan kingdom of Spiti. Nestled in a steep river
valley up against the Chinese border, Spiti is known to Tibetologists
from the earliest historical records as an ancient Tibetan Buddhist
kingdom, located hundreds of miles to the west of the Tibetan capital,
Lhasa. With the drawing of the territorial borders between China and
India after the Chinese takeover of Tibet in 1960, Spiti was excluded
from the Chinese controlled plateau by a mere five miles. It is now part
of the Indian perimeter of defense against the Chinese, and there is a
small military outpost in the valley- Until last summer, the valley was
closed to all visitors.'
Visiting the kingdom of Spiti was an exciting prospect. My research
over the past fifteen years on Tibetan Buddhist legal systems drew me
to Spiti as a possible site for on-the-ground examination of the legal
procedures, fora, and rules I had encountered only as detailed historical
reconstructions among the Tibetans. Here was the possibility of a living
community that had been using the Tibetan Buddhist legal system up
to the present day, largely unimpeded by the Indian government that
had inherited it. At the same time, I was also reading widely on the
topic of secularity in both law and religion, and I was anxious to return
to a society considered nonsecular in order to try out some preliminary
conjectures.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado. I would like to thank Winnifred
Sullivan, Jos6 Cabez6n, Steven D. Smith, Pierre Schlag, Paul Campos, and Robert Burt for their
thoughts on this paper. Susan Spaulding, Brad Bartlett, and Alisa Schreibman provided expert
research assistance.
1. For more information about this part of India, see S.C. BAJPAI, LAHUAL-SPM: FORBID-
DEN LAND IN THE HIMALAYAS (1987).
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The group with which I was traveling with was an all-female crew
comprised of myself, two Taiwanese Buddhist devotees, a San Diego
obstetrician, a native South Asian, two students, and five Tibetan nuns,
including our coordinator, Ani-la Karma Lekshe Tsomo, titular head
of several nunneries in the Spiti area. We flew in from various parts of
the world to meet in New Delhi in early June. Once past our initial
passport and police problems, the group headed up to Spiti by bus and
then jeep. The five-day trip was an exhausting, dangerous experience
due to roads severely damaged by earthquakes and rains, and to the
constant perils of passport seizure or inland permit denials at the many
checkpoints along the way. Thanks to the savvy of the nuns, we made
it, but many coming to attend the ceremony did not.
The ceremony, a two week religious initiation called the Kalachakra
Tantra Yoga Initiation,2 was conducted under diaphanous white tents
spread out over an enormous field. The underlying purpose of the
ceremony is to restore universal harmony and world-time, beginning
with the arising of the universe and moving to the development of the
skills necessary for time maintenance. The Tibetan text that the Dalai
Lama recites instructs the practitioner on the correct path to enlighten-
ment and builds verbally and visually the palace of the Kalachakra
deity in mandalic form.' Simultaneously, monks from the Dalai
Lama's private monastery create an intricate sand-quartz mandala
meant to represent the universe and the deity's palace in two dimen-
sional space.
Why does this ceremony recreate time? Buddhist cosmology is
ambivalent about the extent to which time requires motion and energy.
Time in the Buddhist religious metaphysic has a different quality from
Western notions of time. All cosmic realms in Tibetan Buddhism are
arenas of absolute nonchange and constancy at the same time that they
2. Kalachakra is Sanskrit for "wheel of time." Said to have been written down by the
mythical king Suchandra of Shambhala, the Kalachakra Tantra Yoga Initiation was introduced
into Tibet in 1027 and is considered to be the basis of the Tibetan calendar. See THE
SHAMBHALA DICTIONARY OF BUDDHISM AND ZEN 110 (Michael H. Kohn trans., 1991).
3. Perhaps the simplest modem explanation of the Kalachakra Tantra ritual and its aspects
of time maintenance and re-creation is BARRY BRYANT, THE WHEEL OF TIME SAND
MANDALA: VISUAL SCRIPTURE OF TIBET (1995). The classic and most respected study on the
topic is GIUSEPPE TUCCI, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE MANDALA: WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE MODERN PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SUBCONSCIOUS (Alan Houghton trans.,
1970). The best overall description by a renowned Tibetan teacher and his students is GESHE
LHUNDUB SOPA ET AL., THE WHEEL OF TIME: THE KALACHAKRA IN CONTExT (1985), but a
close second is GESHE NGAWANG DHARGYEY, A COMMENTARY ON THE KALACAKRA TANTRA
(Gelong Jhampa Kelsang trans., 1985), supplemented by Dhargyey's excellent basic explanation
of Buddhism in GESHE NGAWANG DHARGYEY, AN ANTHOLOGY OF WELL-SPOKEN ADVICE
ON THE GRADED PATHS OF THE MIND (Alexander Berzin ed. & Sharpa Tulka trans., 1982). For
more general descriptions of the use of the mandala in legal and political realms in this century,
see REBECCA FRENCH, THE GOLDEN YOKE: THE LEGAL COSMOLOGY OF BUDDHIST TIBET
(1995); and DAVID GELLNER, MONK, HOUSEHOLDER, AND TANTRIC PRIEST: NEWAR
BUDDHISM AND ITS HIERARCHY OF RITUAL (1992).
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encompass unceasing change. The one constant is that nothing in them
remains or abides. Unless able to escape into the empty timelessness of
Nirvana, all sentient beings remain on a cyclical wheel of rebirth. Time,
then, unchanging in its endless changing, has the quality of static-state
universal motion. The guardian of this universal process is the
Kalachakra deity in his palace with his female consort. Thus the
ceremony, by recreating his palace in detail, recreates unending
changing time, the most basic process of the universe.
Near the end of the initiation, the Dalai Lama announced that he
had decided to do a ceremony for the future of Tibet on Kunzom Pass,
at 17,000 feet, where China, India, Spiti, and Lahul are all visible. This
was a remarkable and auspicious opportunity for Tibetan Buddhists,
and the excitement in the local community was palpable. At two a.m.,
in the early-morning moonlight of the day of the announced ceremony,
I found myself running and jumping with several of the nuns across
irrigation ditches and down small dirt paths on our way to the central
road in the valley. We were scurrying to catch jeeps and buses that had
been organized for the long, difficult journey up to the pass, the site of
the ceremony. After many hours on the bus and a breathless two-mile
ascent from a makeshift parking area, the scene on the top of the pass
was arresting. The snow-peaked Greater Himalayas spread out in every
direction in absolute silence. In the far distance, infinitesimal rivers
headed to the north, east, and west. Pungent smoke from piles of
burning juniper placed at each of the cardinal directions filled the thin
air. Dancers from Spiti and Lahul in full dress lined up to perform
their ritual dances while yak handlers stood with their bedecked
animals, each hoping that His Holiness would ride his beast down the
hill after the ceremony.
The Dalai Lama sat in a white Tibetan tent on the highest ground,
near a snowbank, surrounded by a small assembly of chanting monks
and nuns. When I arrived, he was listening to a female oracle who,
reciting from a trancelike state of possession, was telling him the future
of the Tibetan plateau and people. These activities went on for several
hours. Then, at the moment the chanting stopped, the crowd gasped as
three rings of ice crystals encircled the sun overhead. It was an
auspicious place, an auspicious moment, an auspicious ceremony.
There were rumors in the crowd that the Dalai Lama had been told
that Tibet might, at long last, be freed. On his way down, the Dalai
Lama recognized me, waved, and commented joyously on the good
weather during the ceremony. Within minutes, it started to rain, and we
all left in different directions for the long and dangerous return trip
down from and out of the pass.
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This Essay explores the evolution of two current social theories
relevant to religion and law: the theory of secularization and the
theory of detraditionalization. I frame the analytical discussions of
these two theories with three narrative passages in italics-the first
one, above, on the valley of Spiti-to contextualize and act as
counterpoint to the major points of the argument. When reading the
narrative passages, the reader should question the framing of the
analytical presumptions in the theories; and when reading the
analytical sections, the reader should question the framing of the
narratives within these theories. My two central points are: first, that
the current binary models derived from these theories, sacred/secular
and traditional/detraditional, are, at the very least, inadequate; and,
second, that a major reconceptualization of these theories within
American legal thought is necessary.
This Essay tacks back and forth between the three italicized
narratives and the discussions of the two current theories. In Part I,
I explore the first theory, secularization. Secularization theory posits
that societies move from a sacred religious framework to a secular
privatized state in which the role and influence of religion eventually
decrease and disappear. As we will see, this theory has fallen into
disrepute in the religious studies and social science communities, a
circumstance that has not been apprehended by the legal community.
After a second italicized narrative, Part II explores the theory of
detraditionalization. Detraditionalization theory is presented concep-
tually through a binary model of society, with traditional society on
one side and detraditional on the other. It repeats the first two ideas
of secularization theory-transition from the sacred to the secular,
and privatization-but it deemphasizes the third, the decline of
religion. Next, in Part III, Secularity and Detradition in the Law, and
Part IV, Sacredness and Tradition in the Law, I explore briefly how
the theories of secularization and detraditionalization are currently
framed in the legal academy.
In the third italicized narrative, I return to look again at the
narratives in light of, and in spite of, the current theories. I conclude
in Part V, Reconsidering Secularization and Detraditionalization, that
the templates we use as default positions in this area have led us
astray, and I then suggest responses to several of the problems with
the formulations of these concepts. First, I argue that the core ideas
of secular modernism or secularization theory-change in sacred
worldview, privatization and the decline of religion-need to be
disentangled within legal jurisprudence itself. Second, the legal
academy needs to engage seriously the issues that currently occupy
the American religious imagination. Third, the formulation of these
positions into detraditional versus traditional models is too simplistic.
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Fourth, the use of these theories to posit a new and radically different
social order or a lost traditional society is often itself a deliberate act
to carve out an ideological agenda, demark intellectual territory, or
advance one political policy over another.
My final point returns to the ceremony of the first narrative, the
recognition and maintenance within Tibetan Buddhism of the
constancy of unrelenting change through time. Rather than concep-
tualizing law and religion in terms of static models, I argue, perhaps
we need to consider that this very Buddhist idea, a stable religious
canon advocating the concept of unceasing change and impermanence,
has been and is becoming very American. In short, we should
consider the possibility that our most stable tradition has become
constant change and impermanence.
I. THE THEORY OF SECULARIZATION
Since the early nineteenth century, social analyses of religion have
been guided by the concept of secularization, a theory of monumental
weight that has been advocated and refined by each major social
thinker in turn.4 The theory's commonsense premise is that the
secularization of societies like that of Spiti, with its sacred Buddhist
worldview as described above, is an inevitable consequence of the
arrival of modernism as precipitated by technological development.5
4. Perhaps the most encompassing definition of secularization is that of Ernest Gellner in
his classic piece, French Eighteenth-Century Materialism, in A CRITICAL HISTORY OF WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY (Daniel John O'Conner ed., 1986). According to Gellner, the secularizing qualities
of the Enlightenment included:
[the] rejection of supernatural or "spiritual" explanations of phenomena; an insistence or
preference for explanations of phenomena in terms of the structure and activity of matter;
a positive expectation that everything in nature and man can be explained in natural
intramundane terms; determinism and empiricism in epistemology; hedonism and/or egoism
in psychology; belief in reason as the guide and arbiter of life; rejection of the authority of
tradition; utilitarianism in ethics and utilitarianism and/or democracy in politics; pragmatism
with regard to the theory of truth; relativism; and belief in the power of education and of
government and in the possibility of deliberate improvement of human life.
Id. at 278.
5. The presumed inevitability of secularization is an important part of the thesis. As late as
1966, an esteemed theology professor presented this commonsensical position when he stated
that, "in certain modem cultures, if not all, religion so conceived is clearly on the defensive."
BERNARD E. MELAND, THE SECULARIZATION OF MODERN CULTURES 161 (1966). Bryan R.
Wilson states:
The concept of secularization is not employed in any ideological sense, neither to applaud
its occurrence, nor to deplore it. It is taken simply as a fact that religion-seen as a way
of thinking, as the performance of particular practices, and as the institutionalization and
organization of these patterns of thought and action-has lost influence in both England
and the United States in particular, as it has in other western societies.
BRYAN R. WILSON, RELIGION IN SECULAR SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL COMMENT at xi (1966).
He concludes:
The whole significance of the secularization process is that society does not, in the modem
world, derive its values from certain religious preconceptions which are then the basis for
social organization and social action .... [Modem] religion does not begin to compare in
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With secularization, the influence of religion will decline and religious
rituals and beliefs will be privatized. Since the middle of the
nineteenth century, social theorists from Alexis de Tocqueville to Karl
Marx, from William James to Sigmund Freud, and from Emile
Durkheim to Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, have espoused versions
of this theory as either an evolutionary or a universal teleological
process.
The benefits of secularity are the foundation of Sigmund Freud's
castigation of religion as a universal obsessional neurosis based on
repression and displacement of instinct.6 Emile Durkheim wrote on
the unavoidable move from homogeneous, undifferentiated,
mechanical societies to heterogeneous, specialized, organic societies.7
Max Weber predicted an evolutionary progression from religious
society to a modern society that views science as its religion and then
ultimately secularizes science itself.8 More recent formulations in the
works of Bryan Wilson, Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann, and Niklas
Luhmann have refined but continued this theme.9 In short,
secularization has been a central background premise for all social
theory of the last century and a half.
There are three aspects of secularization theory that I would like to
parse out.1° The first aspect is the transition from the sacred to the
secular worldview through the processes of modernity: that is,
differentiation of society, the scientific method, and the market
economy. The central thesis here is that the displacement of religion
from its position of authority to a position of equivalence or even
its influence with the total religious world view which prevailed in simple society and the
subsumption of all activities and all institutions in the religious orientation to the world.
The diversification of society destroyed the dominance of religion and redistributed its
functions. The diminution of diversity.., does not restore religion.
Id. at 227.
6. See SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION (W.D. Robson-Scott trans., 1953)
(1928); SIGMUND FREUD, Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices, in 9 THE STANDARD
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 117 (James Strachey
trans., 1953) (1900).
7. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE (Joseph
Ward Swain trans., London, G. Allen & Unwin 1915) (1912); see also EMILE DURKHEIM, THE
DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans., N.Y., Free Press 1984) (1893); EMILE
DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS (Cornelia Brookfield trans., N.Y.,
Routledge 1992) (1950).
8. See MAX WEBER, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1946).
9. See PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY (1967); THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE
INVISIBLE RELIGION: THE PROBLEM OF RELIGION IN MODERN SOCIETY (Macmillan 1967)
(1963); NIKLAS LUHMANN, THE DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY (1987); WILSON, supra note 5.
10. These three "moments" of the theory of secularization are drawn in large part from JOSt
CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD (1994). It should be noted that several
other authors have different formulations. David Martin, for example, employs at least "four
main spheres of secularization." DAVID MARTIN, THE RELIGIOUS AND THE SECULAR: STUDIES
IN SECULARIZATION 55 (1969).
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diminution is inevitable with the rise of the secular state. In the
medieval European system, the Catholic Church mediated between
temporal activities, divided into sacred and secular, on the one hand,
and the other-worldly activities of God, on the other. The Protestant
Reformation and the Enlightenment gradually broke the institutional
power of the Church. After secularization, the realms were no longer
mediated by the Church, and religion was forced to find a reduced
place within the secular temporal realm.
The second aspect of secularization, often called privatization, relies
on the thesis that the influence and scope of religion moves gradually
from an external to an internal private space. As the inner part of the
person became the sphere for the free expression of religion,
influenced by the writings of Martin Luther, the locus of religious
authority shifted from predominant institutions to individual inquiry.
An example of the privatization thesis is presented in The Invisible
Religion,11 wherein Thomas Luckmann argues that religion and
religious institutions become marginal with the onset of modernity
because the modern search for meaning becomes personal and
connected to a new religious consciousness. This is the "invisible
religion" of modern society, the individual search for private religious
meaning and self-realization. The individual actor segments each kind
of daily activity into a series of unrelated, unconnected part-time roles
of which religion is only one.12 This aspect of secularization theory
stresses the growth of individual agency and actualization, the
construction of the self as the center of society.
The third aspect of the secularization thesis, the decline of religious
influence, practice, and belief, follows from the other two. In the
modern world, religion gradually decreases and eventually disappears,
becoming only a habit of the very old. The decline is a natural
consequence of the loss of place, the rise of a consumer culture, the
contraction of time, and the role of science in addressing and
answering important human questions.13
11. LUCKMANN, supra note 9.
12. Luckmann's thesis is that modem industrial society has developed its own sacred cosmos
comprised of the major themes of "individual 'autonomy,' self-expression, self-realization, the
mobility ethos, sexuality and familism," and the "subordinate themes" of "getting along with
others, adjustment, a fair shake for all, togetherness," and so forth. The structures of the modern
sacred cosmos "represent the emergence of a new social form of religion which, in turn, is
determined by a radical transformation in the relation of the individual to the social order."
LUCKMANN, supra note 9, at 113-14.
13. The best study of decline in religion is Theodore Caplow and his colleagues' 1983
restudy of Muncie, Indiana, comparing it to the original study by the Lynds in 1924. They
assessed eleven major indicators of decline over that sixty-year period as follows: "(1) a decline
in the number of churches per capita of the population; (2) a decline in the proportion of the
population attending church services; (3) a decline in the proportion of rites of passage held
under religious auspices ... ; (4) a decline in religious endogamy; (5) a decline in the proportion
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Beginning in the 1970s, however, several scholars, including Andrew
Greeley 4 and David Martin,15 looking at evidence from the United
States, began to question the "death of God" and the "rise of the
secular city."' 6 Their interest was prompted by growing evidence that
American society was becoming less, rather than more, secular.
Church membership was increasing not declining. 7 In 1976, a born-
again Baptist, Jimmy Carter, was elected President i" and Operation
Rescue and other religious organizations were responding publicly to
abortion and creationism. Millions of Americans were tuning in to
televangelical religious programs such as Jim and Tammy Bakker's
Praise the Lord cable network, as well as the programs of Jerry
Falwell of the Moral Majority, Oral Roberts, Pat Robertson, Jimmy
Swaggert, and others.19 Concurrently, in the wake of the 1973 oil
crisis and the subsequent Shi'ite Islamic revolution that returned
Ayatollah Khomeini to Teheran, the world became aware of Iran's
of the labor force engaged in religious activity; (6) a decline in the proportion of income devoted
to the support of religion; (7) a decline in the ratio of religious to non-religious literature; (8)
a decline in the attention given to religion in the mass media; (9) a drift toward less emotional
forms of participation in religious services; (10) a dwindling of new sects and of new movements
in existing churches; and (11) an increase in attention paid to secular topics in sermons and
liturgy." Although religion had changed in "Middletown," none of these indicators showed a
decline in religion over the period. THEODORE CAPLOW ET AL., ALL FAITHFUL PEOPLE:
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN MIDDLETOWN'S RELIGION 34 (1983).
14. See ANDREW M. GREELEY, UNSECULAR MAN: THE PERSISTENCE OF RELIGION (1972)
[hereinafter GREELEY, UNSECULAR MAN]; see also ANDREW M. GREELEY, RELIGIOUS
CHANGE IN AMERICA (1989).
15. David Martin calls his book a "demolition" of the theory of secularization. See DAVID
MARTIN, THE RELIGIOUS AND THE SECULAR: STUDIES IN SECULARIZATION (1969); see also
CAPLOW ET AL., supra note 13; DAVID MARTIN, A GENERAL THEORY OF SECULARIZATION
(1978).
16. This is a reference to the conceptual framework of modem secular theology by Harvey
Cox. Cox distinguishes between secularization that frees religion and society from oppressive
custom and traditions, and secularism, which he thinks is a new dogmatic ideology with its own
closed worldview, much like a new religion. See HARVEY COX, THE SECULAR CITY (1965).
17. There are now several different studies describing these statistics. See, e.g., UNSECULAR
AMERICA app. (Richard John Neuhaus ed., 1986) (providing statistics). Greeley's work for the
Committee on Social Indicators of the Social Science Research Council analyzing and comparing
long-term data is particularly interesting. He finds no indication that American religion is
decreasing and states that "[t]he secularization model, which has never been confirmed by the
data and has often been disproved-as in this book-nonetheless remains as strong as ever in
scholarly and journalistic circles, unshaken and apparently unshakable." GREELEY, UNSECULAR
MAN, supra note 14, at 128. Martin E. Marty states that from 1920 to 1956, membership in
several American churches increased 50%. See MARTIN E. MARTY, RELIGIOUS EMPIRE (1970),
quoted in JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, AMERICAN EVANGELICALISM: CONSERVATIVE RELIGION
AND THE QUANDARY OF MODERNITY 49 (1983).
18. See generally Leo P. Ribuffo, God and Jimmy Carter, in TRANSFORMING FAITH: THE
SACRED AND SECULAR IN MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY (M.L. Bradbury & James B. Gilbert
eds., 1989) [hereinafter TRANSFORMING FAITH].
19. See generally GILLES KEPEL, THE REVENGE OF GOD: THE RESURGENCE OF ISLAM,
CHRISTIANITY AND JUDAISM IN THE MODERN WORLD 103-05 (Alan Braley trans., 1994).
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militant re-Islamicization movement" as well as resacralization and
fundamentalist movements in Israel, Pakistan, and India.
Beginning in the 1960s, a transformation also began to take place
in American religious institutions, a change championed by some
participants and observers as necessary. Exemplary of this embracing
of new ideas were the reforms of Vatican II, from 1962 to 1965,1
including both the removal of some older saints who had never been
officially canonized (most famously Saint Christopher) from the
universal calendar, and liturgical revision (replacing liturgical Latin
with the vernacular languages of the church communities) .22 A resur-
gence of social conscience rooted in scripture appeared as Martin
Luther King, Jr. used religion to promote a civil rights political
agenda and as right-to-life advocacy emerged after Roe v. Wade.23
Some churches, including constituencies within the Catholic and
Pentecostal Christian Churches, took up social causes in Latin
America and Asia. Women began to knock at the doors of theological
institutions and seminaries, in which they were increasingly welcome.
Theological educational institutions such as the Harvard Divinity
School were radicalized by the liberation theology of Gustavo
Gutierrez, a Peruvian priest who espoused the idea that Christian
commitment includes solidarity with the poor and their struggle for
salvation.24 Postmodern theology, with its emphasis on religious
uncertainty and radical deconstruction of religious texts, was another
offshoot of these changes.
25
20. See generally YOUSSEF M. CHOUEIRI, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM (1990); HENRY
MUNSON, JR., ISLAM AND REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1988).
21. The Second Vatican Council, or Vatican II, "succeeded in producing the greatest changes
in the Roman Catholic Church since the Council of Trent in the 16th century." OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF WORLD RELIGIONS 1017-18 (1997).
22. See A NEW DICTIONARY OF SACRAMENTAL WORSHIP 162 (Peter E. Link ed., 1990).
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Stephen Carter discusses this issue in STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE
CULTURE OF DISBELIEF (1993).
24. See ROBERT MCAFEE BROWN & GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ: AN INTRODUCTION TO
LIBERATION THEOLOGY (1990); see also GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ, THE POWER OF THE POOR:
SELECTED WRITINGS (1983); GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION: HISTORY,
POLITICS AND SALVATION (1973); GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ, THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE You FREE
(1990).
25. Mark Taylor, Carl Raschke, and Edith Wyschogrod are three innovative scholars in this
movement applying postmodern methodology and thought to religious studies. Mark Taylor
specifically attacks the dyadic foundation of the Western theological tradition and ruminates
about the religious uncertainty of the present. In the same way that early theologians "insisted
upon the inseparability of art and religion," Taylor is convinced that "certain developments in
contemporary art and architecture provide untapped resources for religious reflections" in an
a/theology of resistance. MARK TAYLOR, DISFIGURING: ART, ARCHITECTURE AND RELIGION
5 (1992); see also MARK TAYLOR, ERRING: A POSTMODERN A/THEOLOGY (1984). Carl Raschke
has argued that the Biblical Scriptures can be reread to support the absolute equality of men
and women in society. He also blurs the boundaries between the two models that figure largely
in the second half of this paper, traditional and detraditional society. He states that the
postmodern is not the detraditional but rather a "recovery of the richness of the 'natural'
signifiers, if not a return to the naturalism or realism of the late classical era.... Postmodern
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By the mid-eighties, the entire academic community was confront-
ing a resurgence of interest in religion and religious societies in the
wake of resacralization at home and abroad. Granting agencies were
supporting awards to do research on homogeneous religious
populations, such as my initial fieldwork on the Tibetan Buddhists.
The American Academy of Sciences and other foundations began a
large international investigation into fundamentalist religious
groups2 6 called the "Fundamentalism Project." Based at the Univer-
sity of Chicago, the coordinators of the study, Martin Marty and Scott
Appleby, pulled together experts on resacralization movements from
around the world.27
What theorists were gradually discovering was that many of the
core ideas of secular modernism theory had to be uprooted,
reexamined, and perhaps discarded.' Some noted that modernizing
style enfolds within itself, tradition without bowing before the canon, form without formality,
beauty without monumentality, coherence without symmetry." CARL A. RASCHKE, FIRE AND
ROSES: POSTMODERNITY AND THE THOUGHT OF THE BODY 5 (1996); see also CARL A.
RASCHKE & SUSAN RASCHKE, THE ENGENDERING GOD: MALE AND FEMALE FACES OF GOD
(1995). Edith Wyschogrod writes on our conceptualizations of mass deaths, such as at Hiroshima
and Auschwitz, and also on the life narratives of saintly figures and what they tell us about
moral existence in postmodern times. See EDITH WYSCHOGROD, SAINTS AND POSTMODERNISM:
REVISIONING MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1990); EDITH WYSCHOGROD, SPIRIT IN ASHES: HEGEL,
HEIDEGGER AND MAN-MADE MASS DEATH (1985).
26. Modern religious fundamentalism can be defined as having the following characteristics:
a comprehensive religious worldview as "an irreducible basis for communal and personal iden-
tity.., revealed truth as whole, unified and undifferentiated," Martin E. Marty & R. Scott
Appleby, Conclusion: An Interim Report on a Hypothetical Family, in FUNDAMENTALISMS
OBSERVED 814, 817 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1991), literalism and extremism,
the repudiation of "secular-scientific notions of progress and gradual historical evolution," id.
at 819, the "dramatiz[ation] and even mythologiz[ing of] their enemies," id. at 820, protection
of "the group from contamination" to maintain purity, id. at 821, "missionary zeal," id. at 822,
and "charismatic and authoritarian male leaders," id. at 826.
27. See id.; MARTIN E. MARTY, FUNDAMENTALISMS AND SOCIETY: RECLAIMING THE
SCIENCES, FAMILY AND EDUCATION (1993); MARTIN E. MARTY, FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE
STATE: REMAKING POLITIES, ECONOMIES AND MILITANCE (1993). There were several other
large multiauthored projects produced at this time on the same subject. See, e.g., FUNDAMEN-
TALISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Lawrence Kaplan ed., 1992); see also THE POLITICS
OF RELIGION AND SOCIAL CHANGE (Jeffrey K. Hadden & Anson Shupe eds., 1988); PROPHETIC
RELIGIONS AND POLITICS (Jeffrey K. Hadden & Anson Shupe eds., 1986) [hereinafter
PROPHETIC RELIGIONS]; SECULARIZATION AND FUNDAMENTALISM RECONSIDERED (Jeffrey
K. Hadden & Anson Shupe eds., 1989). For an excellent study of the relationship between
American fundamentalism and issues of gender, see MARGARET LAMBERTS BENDROTH,
FUNDAMENTALISM AND GENDER: 1875 TO THE PRESENT (1993).
28. David Martin began this endeavor by asking how secularization theory was used and
what its roots were:
This essay has argued that two of the most widely accepted concepts of secularization
current today (the growth of scientific thinking, the alienation of the proletariat) are rooted
in a utopian metaphysics concerning an ultimate harmony.... These metaphysical systems
transpose Judeo-Christianity ... by transferring a monism of nature to a monism of society.
MARTIN, supra note 10, at 35. Karel Dobbelaere, while interested in maintaining secularization
theory, has called for an investigation into methodology to "scale functional differen-
tiation ... [and] check our hypothesis empirically." Karel Dobbelaere, The Secularization of
Society? Some Methodological Suggestions, in SECULARIZATION AND FUNDAMENTALISM
RECONSIDERED, supra note 27, at 38.
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nations, such as Turkey, that accepted technological developments and
capitalism had not witnessed the secularization of their population nor
even a decline in religion. 9 Others, considering the public versus the
private sphere, wondered whether privatization of religion
precipitated the transformation or loss of public religion.30 Still
others remarked that secularization, when it did occur, proceeded at
different rates and in different permutations in each society.3 Many
commented that resacralization rather than secularization was the
major modern global phenomenon. In their final summary assessing
all of the gathered information, Martin Marty and Scott Appleby of
the Fundamentalism Project noted that most fundamentalism
movements were modern creations with a strong religious cosmology,
and often public rather than privatized religions.32 These were
profoundly unsettling conclusions.
By the late eighties, the theory of secularization or secular
modernity, a cornerstone of the social theory of religion, had fallen
into disrepute in religious studies and in most social science com-
munities.33 The inexorable movement of a society like Spiti's from
its devoutly religious cosmology and strong internal and external
29. Ernest Gellner, for example, postulated, in contradiction to the theory of secularization,
that the advent of industrial and technological capitalism need not be accompanied by either
democracy or secularity: "In the West, we have become habituated to a certain picture,
according to which Puritan zeal had accompanied the early stages of the emergence of a modern
economy, but in which its culnination was eventually marked by a very widespread religious
lukewarmness and secularization .... But on the evidence available so far, the world of Islam
demonstrates that it is possible to run a modern, or at any rate modernizing, economy
reasonably permeated by the appropriate technological, educational, organization principles and
combine it with a strong pervasive, powerfully internalized Muslim conviction and iden-
tification." ERNEST GELLNER, POSTMODERNISM, REASON AND RELIGION 22 (1992).
30. On the public/private distinction, see generally THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION (Jeff
Weinraub & Krisnan Kumar eds., 1996). On the ambiguities and problems with the
public/private distinction in religion, see PROPHETIC RELIGIONS, supra note 27.
31. "What the sociology of religion needs to do is to substitute for the mythical account of
a universal process of secularization, comparative sociological analyses of historical processes
of secularization, if and when they take place." CASANOVA, supra note 10, at 17.
32. Marty and Appleby found that current fundamentalist religious movements are modern
rather than traditional, first in the sense that they are shrewdly exploitative of modern processes,
ideologies, instrumentalities, technologies, and organizational methods and structures. Second,
fundamentalist movements vary widely in their approach to the sacred and in their "patterns of
passive withdrawal from and active engagement with the outside world." Marty & Appleby,
supra note 26, at 840. Some of these religious movements, in other words, are private while
others are highly public. Third, fundamentalist movements provide their members with a "whole,
unified and undifferentiated" revealed truth amounting to a totalizing integrated worldview. Id.
at 818. This finding indicates that a sacred religious cosmology can be effectively invented or
created in a modern setting. See also id. at 817-40.
33. For example, Jeffrey Hadden predicted in 1989 that
secularization theory will be radically revised or relegated to the category of a marginally
useful heuristic pedagogical device, not unlike the theory of 'demographic transition.' The
secular is not going to disappear from modern cultures any more than the sacred. But if
secularization is to be a useful construct for analyzing a historical process, it will have to
be significantly refined.
SECULARIZATION AND FUNDAMENTALISM RECONSIDERED, supra note 27, at 23.
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representations of religion to a fully secular society was no longer
seen as inevitable. Indeed, an excellent recent work on this topic
opens the first chapter with the sentence: "Who still believes in the
myth of secularization?"' The author, Jos6 Casanova, goes on to
state:
How can one explain this reversal? How could there have been
so much myth before and so much light now? ... The answer has
to be that it is not reality itself that has changed, as much as our
perception of it and that we must be witnessing a typical Kuhnian
revolution in scientific paradigms. ... [Tihere can be no doubt
that we are dealing with a radical change in intellectual climate
and in the background worldviews which normally sustain much
of our social-scientific consensus.
35
Last summer, in the height of a blazing Colorado June, I took five
days off to attend an academic conference entitled "Spirituality in
Education, " put on by the Naropa Institute in Boulder, Colorado. The
brochure that Naropa sent stated: "The Spirituality in Education
Conference gathers eminent scholars and spiritual leaders to inquire
into the nature, spirit and practice of contemporary education." The
conference was conducted on a grassy lawn in a voluminous white tent
that could seat up to two hundred, with a full view of the Rocky
Mountains, a setting that reminded me immediately of the initiation in
Spiti.
The scholars and spiritual leaders invited to attend were an interest-
ing lot. There were some academics: the famous world-religions scholar
from Berkeley, Huston Smith; the Chair of the Environmental Studies
Program at Oberlin and author of Earth in Mind, David Orr 6 a
professor emeritus of Temple University, Rabbi Zalman Schachter-
Shalomi; a professor of theology and previous head of the Martin
Luther King, Jr. Memorial, Vincent Harding; and the twelfth president
of Wellesley College, Diana Chapman Walsh. Slated to attend as
panelists were several other well-known persons, including a Buddhist
scholar, a physicist, a famous Quaker author, a medical school
professor, an anthropologist who has become a Buddhist teacher, the
head of a Vermont holistic education resource center, and a former
New York City school teacher who writes on education. This was, to
say the least, an eclectic group.
34. CASANOVA, supra note 10, at 11.
35. Id.
36. See DAVID ORR, EARTH IN MIND: ON EDUCATION, ENVIRONMENT AND THE HUMAN
PROSPECT (1994).
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I must admit that my attendance at the conference was a thinly
disguised attempt to hear and speak with its most famous lecturer, the
Dalai Lama of Tibet, who was scheduled to give a general address and
to conduct a smaller discussion session. It was a chance for me to talk
with him about one of my ongoing projects, translating the Tibetan law
codes, without having to go to Dharamsala, in the mountains of India,
where his government-in-exile sits. So I felt a bit uneasy at this
conference, an interloper who was attending and picking up her security
pass to the white tent every day with a single-mindedness that was
antithetical to the whole process.
From the start, it was impossible not to notice the astonishing
m~lange of ideas, persons, and religious traditions at this conference. I
sat for part of the proceedings with Ileana Porras on my left, an
international law professor from the University of Utah whom I met
just by chance, and on my right, a variety of other attendees.37 Rob,
a "channel," was perhaps the most perplexing and interesting.38
Dressed in what I would describe as well-pressed Lands' End attire, he
told me that he had graduated from the University of Chicago Law
School and currently practiced bankruptcy law in Chicago with an
important firm. In 1983, while sitting alone in his apartment, he was
visited by spirits. He stated that his "first connection with them was
familiar and pleasant, I never wanted to see things or go out of my
body, so that didn't happen, but they can touch me and I know when
they are there." For twelve years, Rob told no one except his close
family members. His sister asked her psychiatrist about Rob's spirit
visits; he responded that Rob obviously was having psychotic episodes.
Today, Rob is more accepting of "his gift" and holds seances in which
the spirits talk through him. Rob's parting comments to me were that
people need to accept that there are different types of realities; they have
to learn to communicate with the spiritual, rather than simply
materialist, realm. As Rob said, "The answers to the mysteries of the
universe are intensely simple, it's just that we don't look for them. It's
like not getting a joke a hundred times."
To an outside observer, it was obvious that nothing "academic"
would be accomplished at this conference in the sense that no jobs were
being decided, no particularly new theories were being advanced, no
37. These included a local Boulder artist, teachers from Wyoming, the speaker on holistic
education from Vermont, a Taoist who professed an interest in the poetry of bell hooks, a self-
described "ecoterrorist" who had formed a special community in southern Kansas, a community
college English teacher from Florida, and a trained legal mediator who described her religious
affiliation as "pagan."
38. Because Rob has not publicly announced his channeling and maintains a large and
important law practice, I changed his name to hide his identity. The people who channel spirits
call themselves "channels" rather than the more common "channelers." See MICHAEL BROWN,
THE CHANNELING ZONE (1997).
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one worried much about impressing either themselves or others. As one
of the participants put it, "I love being at a conference that is not
bounded by credentials!" There were no loud outbursts, no rapid-fire
talks, few instances of heated discussions or repartee, no hurried
meetings in the hallways. Cappuccino carts and falafel wagons, t-shirt
sellers and spiritual book dealers attracted attention between the
lectures. The mood was relaxed, inquiring, empathic, cathartic. After
breaking into small group sessions,39 the full group coalesced again in
the large tent for various "jump-start activities" followed by panel
discussions. The jump-start activities consisted of meditation exercises,
breath training, gospel-hymn singing, yoga instruction, Tibetan
chanting, Jewish and Christian prayer sessions, body-mind stretching
exercises, and sacred space ceremonies. Each night after the dinner
break, there was a short poetry or dance performance followed by a
lecture and comments from the conference faculty.
The theme of the conference was perhaps best expressed by the
physicist Jeremy Hayward in his address, "Unlearning to See Sacred-
ness." To paraphrase his talk, he stated that scientific materialism has
become our religion, embodied in every part of our world, including
our education system, making our world spiritless and soulless. John
Gatto, a former New York City public school teacher, echoed this
theme in a speech describing the contemporary education system, which
he characterized as the commodification of small children and young
adults. According to Gatto, buying things, producing things, getting
things-from material purchases to law degrees to placements in
jobs-has become the center of our lives and our education system.
David Orr spoke about the need to find meaning in locality and place;
he said we need to slow down the velocity of our production, we need
to listen rather than to make new rules, new ideas, new houses.
Near the end of the conference, in a flurry of anticipation and
excitement among the participants, the Dalai Lama arrived for his
major address. He stepped up onto the platform, smiled, bowed with
folded hands, and was seated along with his translator and two security
guards. He closed his eyes for quite a long period to settle himself
before speaking and then rearranged himself and his robes in the chair.
From the hushed anticipation in the audience, it was clear that he
represented the authentic religious person, the exotic and yet highly
familiar, the canonically devout and yet ecumenically acceptable
religious voice. He began simply:
39. We were asked to break out into a variety of smaller groups after each lecture. In my
small session, the facilitator rang a bell and told us to sit silently for a few minutes meditating
on our breath. Participants in the small sessions used terms like "sacred space," 'opening
experience," "feeling connected," "authenticity," and "my inner silence."
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The important thing is to be happy, isn't it? Humans are always
suffering. They say, I am stressed out, I am anxious. Many people
come to me and say this. Also... hmmmm... humans have
anger, hate, jealousy, and their intelligence becomes destructive. So
I feel that a warm heart is really priceless; we all have the potential
to develop a caring, compassionate heart through our education.
This is what will make us happy.
After an hour and a half of detailing Buddhist philosophy, the Dalai
Lama closed with these thoughts:
Training your mind through meditation is the only answer. You as
an individual must train your own mind in a constant effort to be
calm and to show gentleness and compassion to others ... Having
a calm mind and a good heart... hmmm ... these are the most
important things in education. Okay, I am done.4'
He beamed a large smile to the audience and bowed several times with
clasped hands in all directions.
The audience was captivated by the Dalai Lama and his message; it
was silent for several seconds, and then everyone jumped up and burst
into thunderous applause. Most participants walked out of the tent in
a hushed, mesmerized state.
II. THE THEORY OF DETRADITIONALIZATION
As the theory of secularization was turning from a foundational
truth into a mythological beast, a new formulation with very old roots
arose in religious studies and other academic fora: the theory of
detraditionalization.4 a This new positing of secularity operated in
terms of a binary dualism-traditional versus posttraditional.42 The
40. Training the mind is the center of moral regulation and the goal of all education in
Tibetan Buddhist communities. Mind training and inner morality are also the center of the legal
system for Tibetan Buddhists because it is the afflicted mind that creates the conflict and
unhappiness that brings about legal disputes. The purpose of resolving a legal dispute is
ultimately to create calm minds in the parties. See FRENCH, supra note 3.
41. Detraditionalization has been described in various ways. Perhaps the most concise
description is by Anthony Giddens, who asserts the radical disjunction between two worlds, the
traditional and the post- or detraditional: "[Tihe radical turn from tradition intrinsic to
modernity's reflexivity makes a break ... with preceding eras." ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE
CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 175-76 (1991). The word "tradition" comes from the Latin,
tradere, to hand over or deliver. In English it means "a description of a general process of
handing down" with "a strong and often predominant sense of this entailing respect and duty."
RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS 320 (1981).
42. As Barbara Adam notes:
The first thing to be noticed when we examine the concept of detraditionalization is its
reliance on dualistic analyses and either-or frameworks of meaning; authority based on
tradition or reflexivity, located without or within, in pre-given or (self-)constructed orders.
Detraditionalization is constituted with reference to tradition .... fixed with reference to
a postulated past condition and narrowly defined in terms of what it is not.
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Tibetan Buddhists of Spiti in the first narrative were no longer seen
as inevitably progressing toward secularism. Now an image of them
could be fixed and then juxtaposed in opposition to modern secular
society, the world of the just-described Naropa conference: authentic
traditional Tibetan Buddhism versus ersatz detraditional New Age
religion.
In detraditionalization theory, modern society is a post- or
detraditional world, a world that has gone beyond, that has lost sight
of tradition. Paul Heelas, a British academic well known for his work
in religion and cultural studies at Lancaster University, describes the
loss of tradition:
All those politicians, public commentators and academics who
announce the demise of tradition surely have good grounds for
doing so. They can point to the loss of faith in once familiar
landmarks, in long-standing values, more specifically in religion
(less than 10 percent now go to church on Sunday), in the family
(single people now make up a quarter of all British households),
in the monarchy and in the political system (over 40 per cent of
people under the age of 25 did not vote in 1992). 4"
The current social theory of detraditionalization is presented
conceptually through an opposition of two models of society, with
traditional society on one side and detraditional society on the
other.4 This Durkheimian opposition of types of societies is both
structural and temporal. On one side, there is the older traditional
society, less complex, more integrated, localized, religious, and
community-based. The natural order of things in the traditional
society is pregiven and accepted, the cultural metanarrative is sacred,
ancient, and authoritative. The community and the social worldview
leave less movement for the individual. Time is cyclical and tied to
diurnal and seasonal cycles such as the harvest; change is incremental
Barbara Adam, Detraditionalization and the Certainty of Uncertain Futures, in
DETRADITIONALIZATION 134, 136 (Paul Heelas ed., 1996) [hereinafter Adam,
Detraditionalization]; see also BARBARA ADAM, TIME AND SOCIAL THEORY (1990); BARBARA
ADAM, TIMEWATCH: THE ANALYSIS OF TIME (1995) [hereinafter ADAM, TIMEWATCH].
43. Paul Heelas, Introduction: Detraditionalization and Its Rivals, in
DETRADITIONALIZATION, supra note 42, at 1, 1.
44. That the "old and rather tired controversies about rationalization and secularization
which have preoccupied sociologists and others for many years" have been replaced is confirmed
by John Thompson:
In recent years this line of reflection [on tradition] has been renewed and imaginatively
extended by Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, among others. They have used terms such
as "detraditionalization" and the emergence of "post-traditional society" to describe what
they see as an inescapable aspect of the formation of modernity.
John B. Thompson, Tradition and Self in a Mediated World, in id. at 89, 89; see also JOHN B.
THOMPSON, IDEOLOGY AND MODERN CULTURE: CRITICAL THEORY IN THE ERA OF MASS
COMMUNICATION (1990); JOHN B. THOMPSON, THE MEDIA AND MODERNITY: A SOCIAL
THEORY OF THE MEDIA (1995).
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and slow. The example of Spiti, the agrarian Himalayan kingdom that
has retained its ancient ways, fits nicely on this side of the dichotomy.
On the other side of this opposition looms the post- or detraditional
new society, complex, highly diffuse, and globally based. The
worldview is secular in detraditional society and the status quo is
unstable, constantly pushed and reflexively questioned. Technology,
fast communication systems, and mass consumer culture capitalism
have weakened "traditional bonds to cultural values, social positions,
religion [and] marriage."'  The individual is the paramount focus of
the society and its primary actor within institutional bureaucracies.
Time, a fast staccato pulsing, is tied to the clock. At every turn, there
are multiple formulations, myriad choices, hybridic amalgams and
New Age pastiches. The Spirituality in Education Conference at
Naropa may be placed on this side of the opposition.
This opposition of societies has protean forms and is used in social
theory to contrast a wide variety of pasts with the present; for
example, the pre- versus post-Enlightenment periods,47 the feudal
period versus the modern public sphere,48 or the most common
45. One of the most insightful analysts of reflexivity in late modernity is Anthony Giddens.
See GIDDENS, supra note 41; ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF AND
SOCIETY IN THE LATE MODERN AGE (1991) [hereinafter GIDDENS, MODERNITY].
46. Heelas, supra note 43, at 5. Paul Heelas outlines the factors that have created the
posttraditional world by undermining the "authoritative or 'sacred' properties of cultural
metanarratives": technology, the speeding up of communication, pluralistic cultures, "the
fragmented, variegated range of beliefs and values," loss of faith, confusion, and the
undermining of "the exciusivistic claims and credibility of what was previously homogeneous and
therefore unquestioned. In sum, 'plausibility structures' lose their credibility-even collapse."
Id. at 4.
47. There is a wide variety of pre-post-Enlightenment dualistic models in social theory from
which to choose: for example, Jacques Le Goff's discussion of how the medieval imagination
differs from the modern, see JACQUES LE GOFF, MEDIEVAL IMAGINATION (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., University of Chicago Press 1988) (1985); Stanley Tambiah on the
dichotomy between pre-Enlightenment traditional religious and modern scientific worldviews,
see STANLEY TAMBIAH, MAGIC, SCIENCE AND RELIGION AND THE SCOPE OF RATIONALITY
(1990); Brian Tierney's works citing and comparing the correct moral conscience of the medieval
period, see BRIAN TIERNEY, AUTHORITY AND POWER: STUDIES ON MEDIEVAL LAW AND
GOVERNMENT (1980); BRIAN TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE, 1050-1300 (1964);
BRIAN TIERNEY, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT, 1150-
1650 (1982); and Talal Asad's premise that the inner moral order and the personal discipline of
medieval religion is absent in modern religion, see TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION:
DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER IN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM (1993).
48. Jiirgen Habermas posits a difference between the feudal period of the Middle Ages,
which had no real public sphere, and the public sphere emerging in the 18th century and then
developing in the 19th and 20th centuries into a realm of mass consumption, communication, and
publicity. See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996); JURGEN
HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO
A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger trans., 1989); JURGEN HABERMAS, THE
THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987); see also HABERMAS
AND THE UNFINISHED PROJECT OF MODERNITY: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL
DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY (Maurizio Passernin d'Entreves & Seyla Benhabib eds., 1997). For
an interesting new take on the question of pubic spheres, see THE PHANTOM PUBLIC SPHERE
(Bruce Robbins ed., 1993).
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 10: 505
current versions of modern versus late-modern49 or postmodern
society.5" The expanding fields of postmodern theory and cultural
studies are based on this concept of a radical disjunction-classical
notions of a closed, traditional society juxtaposed against a
comprehensive global detraditionalized society, an open, choice-filled,
contingent, urban, risk-filed, desituated world of personal preferen-
ces.
51
The current theory of detraditionalization also repeats the first two
ideas of secularization theory-sacred to secular worldview and
privatization-but judiciously deemphasizes the third and most
problematic of the three, the decline in religion. As to the first of
these ideas, detradition means a loss of a "belief in pre-given or
natural orders of things," and, particularly, in tradition-bearing
institutions.52 This loss of belief in a natural order has been accom-
panied by a turn to reflexivity, a constant questioning of traditional
institutions.53 Charles Taylor has explained it as a fundamental shift
in point of view toward a critical stance and away from the traditional
"doctrine of correspondences," in which a person lives in a religious
world of "publicly understood subjects of divine and secular history,
events and personages that had heightened meaning, as it were, built
into them."54
The second part of the theory of detraditionalization is described
as the shift of authority from "without to within,"55 mirroring the
privatization aspect of secularization theory. Here, the individual has
become the center of authority, and the individual voice has become
the preeminent source of legitimization. At the same time, the
individual is no longer able to act as a coherent moral subject.56 The
49. Anthony Giddens prefers the term "late modernity" to the more common
"postmodernity" because he thinks that current society is part of, and perhaps a reaction to,
modernity. See GIDDENS, supra note 41; GIDDENS, MODERNITY, supra note 45.
50. See DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE (1989); FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM OR THE
CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM (1991).
51. See, e.g., CULTURAL STUDIES (Lawrence Grossberg et al. eds., 1992); THE CULTURAL
STUDIES READER (Simon During ed., 1993); FROM MODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN
ANTHOLOGY (Lawrence Cahoone ed., 1996).
52. Heelas, supra note 43, at 2.
53. See supra note 42.
54. CHARLES TAYLOR, ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY (1991) [hereinafter TAYLOR, ETHICS];
see also CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY
(1989).
55. Heelas, supra note 43, at 2.
56. There is a tension in this aspect of detraditionalism. While the detraditional self is the
center, it is understood by several scholars as an empty center without identity or authority,
without any moral or communal sensibilities, see GELLNER, supra note 29; or as a sort of
"homeless mind," see PETER BERGER, THE HOMELESS MIND (1974); or only as a congeries of
created consumer desires, see Douglas Kellner, Popular Culture and the Construction of
Postmodern Identities, in MODERNITY AND IDENTITY 141 (Scott Lash & Jonathan Friedman
eds., 1992).
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Becks have described it this way: "[F]ar more than earlier, individuals
must, in part, supply for themselves, import [modern guidelines] into
their own biographies through their own actions.., one has to do
something, to make an active effort."57 Individual identities must be
constructed into an "'elective biography,' a 'reflexive biography,' or
a 'do-it-yourself biography."'58 This theory, then, has a more
postmodern flavor to it, and it often includes a normative evaluation,
to the effect that tradition is good and detradition is bad, or vice
versa.
The theory of detraditionalization and its correlate, tradition, traces
a different scholarly lineage from that of secularity, stretching back to
Edmund Burke's analysis of the French Revolution. 9 More recently,
Edward Shils has examined social understandings of tradition, noting
the neglect of its study in the social sciences;' also, Eric Hobsbawm
has focused on the invention of tradition, that is, the process through
which modern phenomena come to be legitimated as "traditional."
His example is the ancient and immemorial pageantry of the British
monarchy, which he demonstrates is not an ancient artifact but a
product of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.61 The
socially constructed nature of traditions was taken a step further by
Benedict Anderson in his work on nationalism. Anderson reasoned
that a range of possible scripts had developed for the story of the rise
of a nation, stories about essentially imagined communities.62 One of
the most interesting current discussions on the concept of tradition is
Barbara Adam's work on the way in which tradition encodes our
understandings of time.63
Where and how do these ideas surface in law and legal theory?
Both of these theories are reflected, albeit often indirectly, in legal
writing. Secularization theory in its classical form, although dead in
57. Ulrich Beck & Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, Individualization and "Precarious Freedoms":
Perspectives and Controversies of a Subject-oriented Sociology, in DETRADITIONALIZATION,
supra note 42, at 23, 25.
58. Id.; see also ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (Mark Ritter
trans., 1992); ULRICH BECK ET AL., REFLEXIVE MODERNIZATION: POLITICS, TRADITION AND
AESTHETICS IN THE MODERN SOCIAL ORDER (1994). This theoretical move to the individual
is related to the reflexive and interpretive turn in the social sciences over the past 25 years that
has brought Weber's concepts of feeling and meaning to the fore.
59. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (Conor Cruise
O'Brien ed., Harmondsworth, Eng., Penguin Books 1969) (1790).
60. See EDWARD SHILS, TRADITION (1981).
61. He takes "invented tradition" to mean "a set of practices, normally governed by overtly
or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values
and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past." Eric
Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 1, 1 (Eric
Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983).
62. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1983).
63. See ADAM, TIME AND SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 42; ADAM, TIMEWATCH, supra note
19981
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much of the academy, is still very much alive in legal theory.
Detraditionalization theory, which posits that the world can be
understood in terms of two opposing models, has recently become
more important in the legal community. Legal scholars employ this
framework, both to create a picture of the law-world using this
dichotomy and to argue strenuously that one of the models is better
or more appropriate or more legally sound than the other.
These normative evaluations of either of the opposing social models
depend on context. Some legal academics celebrate the second half,
the detraditional half of the model, finding the removal of restraints
and rigidity and the emancipation from traditional rule-imposing
institutions to be exhilarating. Part III, Secularity and Detradition in
the Law, discusses secularization and explores some examples of a
detraditional approach by the Supreme Court and current postmodern
jurisprudes.
Other legal academics posit the dichotomy to advance the
traditional half of the model and concomitantly decry the
detraditional as pure contingency, a noisome disorder that will only
lead to further chaos. Legal and other scholars promoting this return
to tradition are discussed in Part IV, Sacredness and Tradition in the
Law. The communitarian nostalgic impulse, the growth in originalism,
and the program of the New Religionists are briefly described. In
each of these legal movements, the traditional model plays an
important part, although in a variety of ways: as a coherent image of
a former constitutional glory, as a rhetorical device to advance a
political or religious position, as a way of imagining a possible other
reality, or as an inquiry into the role of tradition in law itself.
III. SECULARITY AND DETRADITION IN LAW
Most legal theorists do not know that secularization theory is now
considered, at best, a complicated myth. As a consequence, secularity
remains the primary conceptual focus of most arguments on the First
Amendment. As such, the standard legal academic model of religion
is understandably not a strong description of a sacred religious
cosmology, a set of beliefs or rituals. Rather, it is a description of a
"secular public moral order"'  that allows both for tolerance,
neutrality, and equality between religions and also for protection for
64. This term is used by Kathleen Sullivan, who goes on to state: "Secular governance of
public affairs is simply an entailment of the settlement of the Establishment Clause of the war
of all sects against all." Kathleen Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
195, 198-99 (1992). For a cogent statement of the need to retain liberal ideals in the face of the
current New Religionist agenda, see Stephen Macedo, Transformative Constitutionalism and the
Case of Religion: Defending the Moderate Hegemony of Liberalism, 26 POL. THEORY 56 (1998).
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the secular sensibilities of the individuals in the central space.65 The
liberal academic model also falls on the modern detraditional side of
the detraditional/traditional opposition, supporting technology and a
scientific worldview as a basic foundation for society.6
6
The privatization aspect of detradition theory has been advanced
by the Supreme Court since the mid-1960s. In the early military draft
cases of United States v. Seeger67 and Welsh v. United States,68 the
Court was asked to look at personal beliefs about religion with
respect to conscientious-objector status. In Welsh, Justice Black stated
that the Court is not bound by "traditional or parochial concepts of
religion" and that a personal moral code is equivalent to theistic belief
for the purposes of the statute if "these beliefs play the role of a
religion and function as a religion" in the individual's life.69 These
cases press for the post- or detraditional. They uncouple the statutory
definition of "religion" from a historically legitimated set of ideas and
institutional attachments centered around theistic, extra-worldly
beliefs and practices, making religion a private choice. This language
supports the shift of authority from "without to within" and echoes
Luckmann's "invisible religion" thesis: the idea that religion has
become the individual's search for private religious meaning.7 °
65. Justice Brennan's dissent in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 501, a case in which an
Orthodox rabbi was denied the right to wear a yarmulke in the Air Force, notes the importance
of the secular sensibilities of individuals to religious markers:
The Government notes that while a yarmulke might not seem obtrusive to a Jew, neither
does a turban to a Sikh, a saffron robe to a Satchidananda Ashram-Integral Yogi, nor
dreadlocks to a Rastafarian....
Id. at 519 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
As a consequence, in pluralistic societies such as ours, institutions dominated by a majority
are inevitably, if inadvertently, insensitive to the needs and values of minorities when these
needs and values differ from those of the majority.
Id. at 523-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. Two examples of the Supreme Court's support for a scientific worldview are Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), on Arkansas's anti-evolution statute, and Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578 (1987). At issue in Edwards was the constitutionality under the First Amendment
of Louisiana's Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School
Instruction Act of 1982, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.1-.7 (West 1982). For the majority,
Justice Brennan stated that the requirements of secularity and neutrality are fulfilled by a
"comprehensive science curriculum" and not by a creation-science class. Edwards, 482 U.S. at
586.
67. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
68. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
69. Id. at 339. There are many other examples of the Court promoting privatization of
religion, such as Chief Justice Burger's statement in Lemon v. Kurtzman that "the Constitution
decrees that religion must be a private matter,... a private choice." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
70. Colin Campbell has warned, however, that "the positive claims surrounding the
detraditionalization thesis should be regarded as suspect on the grounds that it is a mistake to
imagine that a decline in the power and influence of tradition automatically leads to a world in
which individuals engage in more reflexive forms of conduct." Colin Campbell,
Detraditionalization, Character and the Limits of Agency, in DETRADITIONALIZATION, supra note
42, at 149.
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Another example of a group celebrating the move to a post- or
detraditional world is undoubtedly the postmodernists. The advent of
postmodern jurisprudence in the 1960s is often described as a radical
disjunction. From Law and Economics to Critical Legal Studies, from
Feminist Jurisprudence to Critical Race Theory, each of these new
movements takes as a central tenet the disestablishment of the
traditional pregiven Langdellian "natural order of things" in law. But
each presents a different reformulation, a different
detraditionalization from the Langdellian model of law.
Postmodern jurisprudence within the legal academy exhibits aspects
of detraditional thought. Gary Minda, in Postmodern Legal
Movements, describes postmodern legal thought as having "recovered
and exposed contradiction, paradox, and ambiguity within the
fragmentary features of American jurisprudential theory."71 This
postmodern era in legal scholarship is a period of "instability" due to
"proliferating new discourses and intellectual practices for the study
of jurisprudence," with "multiple discourses and methodologies that
le[a]d to major paradigm shifts., 72 The key intellectual themes,
according to Minda, are all detraditional: "antifoundationalism,
antiessentialism, social construction and deconstruction."73
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of both secularization and
detraditionalization theory as they appear in the legal academy is the
general absence of religion. Minda's 350-page book never mentions
religion. Although a fluorescence of religious thought and spiritualism
has blossomed in the United States in the last thirty years, none of
the celebratory postmodern jurisprudential movements in law has
included religion-New Age or fundamentalist, liberation theology or
channeling-in any form.
IV. SACREDNESS AND TRADITION IN THE LAW
Championing the other half of the model, many recent books, both
scholarly and popular, such as Alan Bloom's The Closing of the
71. GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL THOUGHT 190-91 (1995).
72. Id. at 191.
73. Id. Peter Schanck, in outlining the key features of detraditionalization in the law, gave
four postmodern features he found noteworthy:
(1) The self is not and cannot be an autonomous, self-generating entity; it is purely a social,
cultural, historical, and linguistic creation. (2) There are no foundational principles from
which other assertions can be derived; hence, certainty as the result of either empirical
verification or deductive reasoning is not possible. (3) There can be no such thing as
knowledge of reality; what we think is knowledge is always belief and can apply only to the
context within which it is asserted. (4) Because language is socially and culturally
constituted, it is inherently incapable of representing or corresponding to reality; hence, all
propositions and all interpretations, even texts, are themselves social constructions.
Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory
Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2508-09 (1992).
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American Mind,74 have taken as their central motif the shallowness
of current society and the need for a return to more traditional
values. Another theme is the return to "real religion" as opposed to
a detraditionalized "kitsch" version of religion.7" Richard Neuhaus's
journal, First Things, takes as its basic premise the need for a more
serious religious perspective in political, social, and legal thought.76
These themes present the contrasting plaintive view that
detraditional society is disordered, contingent, valueless, destructive,
and degenerate.77 Supporters of tradition celebrate a pregiven
natural order supported by tradition-bearing institutions, community,
a sense of place, and the deemphasis of the individual.78 There is
often a constructed or imagined aspect to these works, a nostalgic and
romantic cast to their depiction of the previous order. Com-
munitarianism, in both its political and scholarly forms, is one such
example of a restatement of tradition as a return to an idealized past,
a healthier, more stable social order.79 Hillary Rodham Clinton's
recent book, It Takes a Village, draws on similar communitarian
themes of retraditionalization. °
74. ALAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: How HIGHER EDUCATION HAS
FAILED DEMOCRACY AND IMPOVERISHED THE SOULS OF TODAY'S CHILDREN (1987).
75. Robert Bellah has argued in a series of books that the moral order and communal focus
of our society with its original basis in biblical religion has been shattered by modern capitalism,
secular liberalism, and individualism. See ROBERT N. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT (1975);
ROBERT N. BELLAH, THE GOOD SOCIETY (1992); ROBERT BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985). For a more popular
version of the thesis that we have lost "real religion," see David Klinghoffer, Kitsch Religion,
in DUMBING DOWN: ESSAYS ON THE STRIP MINING OF AMERICAN CULTURE 250 (Katharine
Washburn & John F. Thornton eds., 1996).
76. First Things is published by the Institute on Religion and Public Life in New York City.
Richard John Neuhaus argued in the influential book THE NAKED SQUARE: RELIGION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984), that democracy is threatened by secularization, which saps
the necessary integrating moral vision of society and leaves us without a shared moral discourse.
77. Paul Heelas has called this point of view the "doom-and-gloom thesis." Paul Heelas, On
Things Not Being Worse, and the Ethic of Humanity, in DETRADITIONALIZATION, supra note
42, at 200, 201. The pessimistic scholars he characterizes as worried about cultural metanarrative
collapse include Peter Berger, Anthony Giddens, Fredric Jameson, Alasdair Maclntyre, Alan
Bloom, Arnold Gehlen, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Christopher Lasch. See id., at 201-02. In
another sense, decrying the present and praising the past is itself a traditional move in American
social theory. As Timothy W. Luke aptly puts it, "seeing the past (tradition) in ruins and the
present (modernity) as its ruination is now 'traditional' for us." Timothy W. Luke, Identity,
Meaning and Globalization: Detraditionalization in Postmodern Space-time Compression, in id.
at 109, 114.
78. The Supreme Court made its classic statement of the traditional way of life in the famous
case Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). There Chief Justice Burger stated that the Amish
exemplify our traditional "early national life" and have "sought to return to the early simple,
Christian life, deemphasizing material success, rejecting the competitive spirit and seeking to
insulate themselves from the modern world" and finding salvation in the life of "a church
community separate and apart from the world and worldly influences." Id. at 217.
79. See RIGHTS AND THE COMMON GOOD: THE COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE (Amitai
Etzioni ed., 1995).
80. Although she presents bureaucratic government as a major constituent of her idealized
"village," Clinton also emphasizes that children are the product not only of heredity and family,
but also of a wider village that includes neighborhood and church. See HILLARY RODHAM
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In law, there are two rather distinct movements toward tradition.
The first, originalism, bears little resemblance to the theory of
detraditionalization as posited by social theorists. Instead, the key
issues of originalism have been framed in terms of the accuracy of the
textual interpretations of the Constitution and the concept of
precedent. Justice Antonin Scalia and others have been a central force
in advocating a detailed examination of the Constitution within its
social and historical context.81 Scholarship on the constitutional era,
interpretation of the Constitution, and considerations of its social
context, as well as discussions of the role of tradition and precedent
in the law, have all grown extensively in the past decade.8" These are
exercises in the reconstruction of tradition, and analyses of this body
of work and its import have also been extensive.83
The other legal movement toward tradition, headed by a group
variously called the New Religionists or the Critical Religion
Theorists," concentrates on the issues significant in
CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE: AND OTHER LESSONS CHILDREN TEACH US (1995).
81. For a small sampling of the material in this area, see Daniel Farber, The Originalism
Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989); Allen R. Kamp, The Counter-
Revolutionary Nature of Justice Scalia's "Traditionalism," 27 PAC. L.J. 99 (1995); Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism
as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599 (1989); and David A. Strauss, Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
82. See, e.g., JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING
OF THE CONSTITrTION (1996); Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177
(1993); Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990); David Luban,
Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035 (1991).
83. One commentator concluded that Justice Scalia's allegiance to an originalist
interpretation of the Constitution is not as important as his allegiance to his own brand of
traditionalism "in order to reach results that he finds politically congenial." Jeffrey Rosen,
Originalist Sin: The Achievement of Antonin Scalia and Its Intellectual Incoherence, NEW
REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at 26, 28.
Rosen does not cite Grant Gilmore, whose somewhat cynical observations of this process in
the 1974 Storrs Lectures prefigured Rosen's views. Gilmore spoke of the movement of law as
an oscillation between periods in which law was conceived of as traditional, formal, and a unified
whole; and periods in which it was viewed as detraditional, pluralistic, diverse, innovative, and
bottom-up:
During periods of apparent social dissolution the traditionalists, the true believers, the
defenders of the status quo, turn to the past with an interest quite as obsessive as that of
the radicals, the reformers and the revolutionaries. What the true believers look for, and
find, is proof that, once upon a time, things were as we should like them to be: the laws of
economics worked; the streams of legal doctrine ran sweet and pure; order, tranquility and
harmony governed our society. Their message is: turn back and all will be well.
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 102 (1977).
84. Theodore Y. Blumoff uses the term "New Religionists" to describe this group. See
Theodore Y. Blumoff, The New Religionists' Newest Social Gospel: On the Rhetoric and Reality
of Religions' "Marginalization" in Public Life, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1996). Ruth Teitel calls
this new movement "Critical Religion Theory" See Ruth Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics
in the Public Sphere, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 747, 754 (1993). The same group is described as
attempting a "new infusion of religion into American politics" in Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in the Constitutional Order, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 347, 350
(1995). This group is different, in my opinion, from "Christian Legal Studies" or those espousing
the idea of a moral tradition of scholars such as H. Jefferson Powell. See Jim Chen, The Moral
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detraditionalization theory, namely, the preordained-natural-order
worldview and the overemphasis on the individual. This
group-including prominent members such as Michael Perry, Michael
McConnell, Sanford Levinson, Winnifred Sullivan, Steven D. Smith,
Philip Johnson, Kent Greenawalt, Stephen Carter, and Mary Ann
Glendon-espouses the return to a serious consideration of religious
issues in legal discourse.
Surprisingly, many of the New Religionists have focused on the
decline of religion in the public sphere as a central problem, but their
argument has taken a turn different from that of secularization theory.
They do not state that religion itself is declining. Rather, they criticize
liberal secular theory for restricting and causing the decline of
religious expression within legal discourse. Michael McConnell, a self-
proclaimed New Religionist, has stated that he is forced to be
bilingual, conversant in both legal language and religious language,
because he is not allowed to bring his religious views into legal
discussions.85 Some New Religionists see the increasing secularity of
the public sphere as an example of the general decline in morality,86
while others see it as diminishing a general understanding of
religion.87 Kent Greenawalt has questioned secularity as a sufficient
basis for making political arguments and decisions,8 and Michael
Perry has pointed out the problems with moves by the administrative
state into the realm of religion.89 The exclusion of moral discourse
Tradition of American Constitutionalism: A Theological Interpretation of H. Jefferson Powell, 11
CONST. COMMENTARY 599 (1995). Also, the Law and Theology movement, with members such
as Milner Ball, can be understood as related but distinct. See MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND
THE LAW (1993).
85. This is a paraphrase of his statement made during a Religion and Law panel including
Kent Greenawalt, Michael McConnell, and Bruce Ackerman at the American Association of
Law Schools Meeting, San Antonio, Texas, January 1995.
86. Judge Arlin Adams cites Harold Berman for the proposition that religion is necessary
to the foundation of the state: "People will desert institutions that do not seem to them to cor-
respond to some transcendent reality in which they believe-believe in with their whole beings,
and not just believe about, with their minds." Arlin Adams, Recent Decisions by the United
States Supreme Court Concerning the Jurisprudence of Religious Freedom, 62 U. CIN. L. REV.
1581, 1598 (1994) (quoting HAROLD BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 73
(1974)).
87. Stephen Carter's thesis is that religion is treated as a hobby by modern liberals. See
Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 977. Stephen Carter's now-famous book The Culture of Disbelief, supra note 23, describes
the ways in which the American legal system trivializes religion as an unimportant part of the
human personality.
88. See KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); Kent
Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REv. 352, 398 (1985); Kent
Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice: Some Further Thoughts, 39 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1019 (1990). In Love and Power, Michael Perry argues for the connection between the
religio-moral consensus and political values such as human rights. See MICHAEL PERRY, LOVE
AND POWER (1991).
89. See Michael Perry, Religion, Politics and the Constitution, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
407 (1996) (arguing that the government should not judge religious practices or tenets). Sanford
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from the law9° and the lack of a holistic viewpoint are other topics
of New Religionist writing.91 The New Religionists have also taken
a fresh look at the period of the Framers of the Constitution and
described the complex role of religion and the importance of the
sacred worldview in the founding of our country.92
But the New Religionists, like the postmodernists, also do not
present the views of members of "New Religions" such as Scientology
or the New Age spirituality movement, represented by Rob the
Channel. The religions many of them represent tend to be
majoritarian religions. Also, the New Religionists are often
detraditional, not traditional, in terms of their support for the
scientific viewpoint, technology, and consumer culture. And their
belief in the possibility of a sacred worldview in modern culture fits
neither model. These contradictions reveal the structural and
theoretical problems with the current legal framing of these issues.
A summer ago, high on Kunzom Pass in the Greater Himalayas, the
Dalai Lama of Tibet, surrounded by chanting monks and nuns, listened
to an oracle in trance. This image has been the template in this paper
for the traditional religious closed society, the society with a natural
order worldview, cyclical time, hierarchy, and ritual. When examined
closely, however, the Dalai Lama's visit to Spiti itself was very
nontraditional: It would have been unacceptable for the charismatic
head of the Tibetan state to travel outside of the capital city or to do
this particular ceremony in public even twenty years ago. There are
several other radically detraditional aspects to the narrative, including
the establishment of nunneries and the outsider status and female sex
of their founder. The ceremony on the pass was highly unusual due to
its dangerous location and the use of a new female oracle from the
region of Amdo, as well as for the head of state speaking directly to
Levinson, in his review of Perry's book Love and Power, supra note 88, states that religious
reasons and sensibilities should not be excluded from political argument. See Sanford Levinson,
Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2061, 2076-77 (1992).
90. See Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753
(1984); R. Randall Rainey, Law and Religion: Is Reconciliation Still Possible?, 27 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 147 (1993). Other groups, besides the New Religionists, have made important claims about
moral discourse. For instance, the work of James Boyd White and Martha Nussbaum provide
primary examples from the Law and Literature movement. Law and Theology movement
members, such as Milner Bali, have been writing in this area for some time.
91. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities and the Religious Freedom Language
of the Constitution, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 672 (1992). For one of the most detailed and
interesting critiques of current legal and religious discourse and its shortcomings in perspective,
see WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PAYING THE WORDS EXTRA: RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1994).
92. For two excellent examples of work in this area, see STEPHEN D. SMITH, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE PRIDE OF REASON (1998); and STEPHEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED
FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995).
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foreigners in public (about the weather, no less). While apparently
traditional, this two-week period in Spiti can be understood as radically
detraditional.
Similarly, the conference at Naropa and Rob the Channel do not
serve well as templates for posttraditional, fragmented, secular society.
America has a long history of spiritualism and connection to the
supernatural, beginning in 1848 with the rapping fingers of young Kate
Fox.93 During spiritualism's heyday in the late nineteenth century,
spiritual mediums throughout the country connected with a wide variety
of dead relatives as well as historical figures ranging from Oliver
Cromwell to Catherine of Aragon.94 Imbued with the ideas of reincar-
nation and communication with the dead, American spiritualists such
as William Henry Channing argued that each person was inherently
divine and "an immortal image of the Infinite One. "95 Spiritualists
were also very optimistic about their common vision for all humanity
and the eventual union of science and religion, attitudes that were not
shared by the mainstream religions of that period.96 They were allied
with the Transcendentalists and other mystical groups that have since
had a lasting influence on American literature and philosophy.97 The
call to a move away from materialism at the Naropa conference, to
reconnect to the spiritual center, to see sacredness in everyday life, to
move from the mind to the heart, are messages that have typified
evangelical and other religious movements in the United States since its
origin. Indeed, those were also the central messages of some of the
93. Kate Fox was one of three sisters living in a farm house with her family in New York
in 1848. Constant rapping on the walls had disturbed previous owners of the house. Mr. Fox's
youngest daughter challenged the rapping sounds to repeat exactly her number of raps. Once
communication was established, a code was developed that allowed the rapping spirit to reveal
that he was a man who had been murdered in the house. Kate Fox and her sister, who are
credited with starting spiritualism in America, spent their lives acting as mediums and allowing
dead human personalities to speak through their agency. See SLATER BROWN, THE HEYDAY
OF SPIRITUALISM (1970); ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE HISTORY OF SPIRITUALISM (1926).
94. See BROWN, supra note 38, at 50-54. Most mediums were women, who played an
important part in the spiritualism movement. See ANN BRAUDE, RADICAL SPIRITS:
SPIRITUALISM AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1989). For a
comparison to the role of women in the New Religions, see ELIZABETH PUTTICK, WOMEN IN
NEW RELIGIONS: IN SEARCH OF COMMUNITY, SEXUALITY AND SPIRITUAL POWER (1997).
95. William Channing, The New Church, 3 SPIRITUAL TELEGRAPH 42 (1854).
96. Michael Brown points out several important differences between the two periods of
spiritualism, the late 19th century and the late 20th century: "[W]hile nineteenth-century
spiritualism saw science as the potential savior of spirituality, the New Age now sees spirituality
as the savior of science." BROWN, supra note 38, at 51. He also says: "Spiritualists hoped to
reform Christianity which they felt was corrupted by money and dogmatism" whereas
"[c]hannels, in contrast, express little interest in Christianity." Id. at 52.
97. For a more detailed discussion of all of these mystical religious movements, including
Theosophy, Swedenborg's New Jerusalem Church, and the American Spiritualist churches, see
AMERICAN ALTERNATIVE RELIGIONS (Timothy Miller ed., 1995). The most unusual
compendium on the topic of current New Age Religions yet assembled is surely ANDREW
RAWLINSON, THE BOOK OF ENLIGHTENED MASTERS: WESTERN TEACHERS IN EASTERN
TRADITIONS (1997).
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original European sectarian settlers fleeing intolerant institutionalized
religions in their homelands.
V. RECONSIDERING SACRED/SECULAR AND
TRAD1TION/DETRADITION
What these exegeses of the two narratives highlight is the im-
mediacy of our categorization of religious circumstances into cookie-
cutter models of tradition and detradition and the general inadequacy
of those characterizations. These templates act as default positions
along with our false presumption of the inevitability of secularization
and its necessity for modern, technological capitalism. Depicting time
in temporal snapshots, these categories are not only inadequate, but
are also characteristically false representations of reality. The
narratives further highlight several of the issues and problems with the
current formulations of religion in law.
First, secularization is now, in the most strident assessment, a theory
in an advanced stage of dissolution. From a more sanguine perspec-
tive, it is, at the very least, more complex than the solid presumptions
of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. Regardless, it is a slim foun-
dation for the major position of American legal academics. Cognizant
of the Kuhnian shift that has taken place, scholars in religious studies
and other fields have been working for several years on more refined
analyses of secularity that could be used by the legal academy.98 In
particular, the core ideas of secular modernism theory-a change in
worldview, the decline of religion, and privatization-need to be
disentangled within legal jurisprudence itself. The privatization
aspect-the move from without to within-needs to be reexamined in
light of the recent legal analyses of individual rights and identity
politics.
Second, the legal academy is simply not talking about many of the
issues that currently seize the American religious imagination. As the
New Religionists have pointed out, the standard secularist legal
academic position is not a model of religion that fits within the state.
98. For a long time, Charles Taylor has called for a new type of conversation: "What our
situation seems to call for is a complex, many-leveled struggle, intellectual, spiritual and political,
in which the debates in the public arena interlink ... " TAYLOR, ETHICS, supra note 54, at 120.
The work of Jose Casanova, showing the different trajectories of secularization in Spain, Poland,
Brazil, and the United States, is excellent. See CASANOVA, supra note 10. James Beckford and
Thomas Luckmann have tried to do a more subtle analysis of secularization and modernity. See
JAMES A. BECKFORD & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE CHANGING FACE OF RELIGION (1989).
Another example is Andrew Greeley, who posits five possible models for religion in society: a
secularization model, a cyclic model, an episodic event model, a stability model, and a religious
growth model. He then tests each of these against statistical data. See GREELEY, UNSECULAR
MAN, supra note 14. Linell Cady, in trying to determine the role that religion and theology can
and should play in the public sphere, distinguishes between public religion, civic religion, and
public theology. See LINELL CADY, RELIGION, THEOLOGY AND AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (1993).
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It is rather a description of "secular public moral order," protected
from religious influence, that tolerates religions as it shields the
secular sensibilities of individuals.99 Current legal jurisprudential
movements such as Law and Economics, Critical Legal Studies, and
Feminist Legal Jurisprudence do not address religion critically nor
present the model of religion their adherents would find most
appropriate. The Supreme Court and the originalist group of legal
scholars have been spending their energies determining what was said
and thought two hundred years ago as a way of positing a traditional
model that aligns more closely with changes they would like to see
effectuated today. None of these scholars has considered the vast
resacralization movement or the widely influential New Age Religion
Movements typified by Rob the Channel, and few-the New
Religionists are an exception here-do more than demonize as
illiberal pontifications of the fundamentalist right the legal positions
of groups operating within strong religious cosmologies. Creating new
legal theories on religion without knowledge of these groups and ideas
will be difficult.
Third, the current formulations of these positions into traditional
versus detraditional models is just too simplistic. To begin with, the
empirical picture is always more complex. There is a great deal of
secularity in the current traditional viewpoints and sacredness in the
current posttraditional views." Using detraditionalization theory,
the Tibetans and the Dalai Lama become "traditional" even though
they have experienced and coped with enormous changes and have
adapted to new environments, ambiguous political situations, and the
advent of the information age. Similarly, Rob the Channel becomes
a fleeting image of our decontextualized, fragmented, narcissistic
postmodern age instead of a part of a long-standing American affair
with religious spiritualism. Points made about these models, such as
the critical reflexivity and pluralism of the current movement, the
constant questioning of canons and institutions, and the multiple
available trajectories, are presumed rather than examined or
historically contextualized. Is religion in modern America more or less
reflective about tradition than in 1517 with the hammering of the
Ninety-Five Theses on the door of Wittenberg Cathedral? Are there
99. See Rebecca French, From Yoga to Yoder: Traditional, Modern, and Postmodern Models
of Religion in U.S. Constitutional Law (May 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
100. Martin Marty has described it this way: "In history, at least in American history, a
secular society has not replaced a sacral one, nor is a new sacral society now in turn displacing
a secular one. Almost wherever one looks in the past, one finds the two tangled, interposed,
mirroring each other." Martin E. Marty, The Sacred and Secular in American History, in
TRANSFORMING FAITH, supra note 18, at 1, 3. What we have instead is a "religio-secular,
operative-passional, sacro-secular life and society." Id. at 8.
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more or fewer religious trajectories available than during the Peasant
War period of social and political unrest following the Reformation?
Fourth, the positing of a new and radically different social order or
the positing of a lost traditional society is often itself a deliberate act,
as social constructionist theory and the initial work of Hobsbawm and
others reveal.10' These models are often posited in an effort to
demark intellectual territory, to carve out an ideological agenda, to
deal with what is perceived as rapid change, or to advance one
political party over another. Tradition and detradition, in short, are
often imagined and rarely investigated. We hear very little in the
postmodern literature, for example, about how similar the advent of
the new communications technology is to the introduction of
comparable technical innovation in other periods, such as the printing
press in Europe in the sixteenth century, which many credit as
essential to the success of the Protestant Reformation. Similarly, this
fixing of social models into sacred-traditional/secular-detraditional
ignores the adaptation and creation of new traditions that occur
constantly, the ongoing renewal of tradition-maintaining and tradition-
eliminating processes. This constant renewal is not a duality; it is a
process.102 All societies operate with habits, routines, procedures,
and rules; and these elements of the society, even as they change,
form a substantial part of its ongoing traditions.13 Many
"traditional" aspects of societies-science in the United States, for
example-are old and ingrained and yet have managed to appear new
and exciting.
One final point: The Buddhist ideas of tradition-maintaining and
tradition-eliminating, of reconceptualizing tradition itself as an
ongoing process of change, are pertinent to our present inquiry. The
ceremony that I attended in Spiti, an ancient ritual that is handed
down from one generation to the next within a monastery changing
and adapting to each new generation, was designed to recreate time.
Time in the Buddhist religious metaphysic is not a linear progression
from one place to another, but a recognition that there is a constant,
unrelenting change. Death, incarnation, rebirth-each represents a
continuing process of renewal in Buddhism that is unchanging in its
101. See supra notes 61 and 62.
102. Barbara Adam has noted: "The conventional way of understanding the time-
consciousness of ancient mythical cultures as distinct from modem Western societies is to impose
the imagery of cyclical and linear time respectively .... Nietzsche can be held responsible for
having disseminated this simplification most effectively and pervasively." ADAM, TIME AND
SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 42, at 133. But, she notes, tradition, if one is to use the term, is best
understood as a process that is continually self-renewing. See Adam, Detraditionalization, supra
note 42, at 146-47.
103. See MICHAEL YOUNG, THE METRONOMIC SOCIETY: RHYTHMS AND HUMAN
TIMETABLES (1988).
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ceaseless changing. Throughout the almost two-week ceremony in
Spiti, monks inside a temple next to the Dalai Lama constructed a
large, intricate, brightly-colored quartz-sand mandala depicting every
aspect of the palace of the guardian of this universal process, the
Kalachakra deity with his female consort. With the last clang of the
gong and the end of the ritual, the same monks who had spent three
weeks, ten hours a day, painstakingly creating the sand mandala, after
the first brief stroke of the Dalai Lama, took up a brush and swept
the entire edifice away. Pouring the chaotic mixture of colored sand
slowly into a bronze vessel, they cleaned the area and wiped off the
surface. With this final ritual, the constancy of change and the
temporal impermanence of all earthly practices was reenacted.
My final point is that we should consider the possibility that our
most stable tradition has become constant change and impermanence.
This is a very Buddhist idea, a stable religious canon advocating the
concept of unceasing change and impermanence; but it has also been,
and is becoming, very American. I argue that this is exactly why we
are discussing the nostalgic past-we have embraced a tradition of
constant change in most areas of law and religion."~ Both science
and the common law process are anchored in such an apparent
contradiction; both are stable practices that forge ceaselessly changing
patterns of renewal. They have already eliminated the binary duality
of traditional and detraditional by focusing on the process of constant
creation. What is perhaps different here, of course, is that the
American tradition of change has been oriented historically toward
progress and improvement, while the Buddhist idea is not."0 5
Nevertheless, whether or not we are progressing, I would argue that
our tradition in both religion and law, much like the mandala built
and destroyed during the Kalachakra ceremony, has become one of
both impermanence and change, sacredness and secularity.
104. Long an astute social theorist, Zygmunt Bauman states: "The paradox of tradition is
that once it has been spoken, the tradition is no more what its spokesmen claim it to be.
Tradition is invoked for the authority of its silence .... Tradition vanishes in the self-same
discourse which purports to make its presence tangible." Zygmunt Bauman, Morality in the Age
of Contingency, in DETRADITIONALIZATION, supra note 42, at 49, 49; see also ZYGMUNT
BAUMAN, INTIMATIONS OF POSTMODERNITY (1992); ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, THE LEGISLATORS
AND INTERPRETERS: ON MODERNITY, POST-MODERNITY, AND INTELLECTUALS (1987).
105. The Buddhist idea of change does include the concept of enlightenment, which has been
understood by some Buddhist schools as progressive change (rarely instantaneous) toward a
goal. Without delving into the complexities of Buddhist philosophy, I think that my statement
holds true in general for the Buddhist view of time.
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